Martín Grunwald

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Education

Ph.D. Economics, Arizona State University — 2021 - 2027 (expected)
Advisor: Hector Chade

M.Sc. Economics, Arizona State University — 2022

B.A. Economics, Universidad ORT, Uruguay — 2016-2020

Research Fields

Microeconomic Theory, Organizational Economics, Political Economy

Working Papers

Knowledge in Organizational Hierarchies

We study the endogenous formation of organizations by extending the framework of Garicano and Rossi-Hansberg (2004). This is done by endogenizing the distribution of knowledge through pre-match education investment. Education is costly, depends on ability, and stochastically improves realized knowledge (á la Chade and Lindenlaub (2022)). Firstly, this means that we account for equilibrium effects: knowledge acquisition depends on expected earnings, which in turn are affected by the education choices of all agents. Secondly, as a technical contribution, we decouple the problem of acquiring knowledge from that of how to organize it by modeling knowledge acquisition as stochastic. The equilibrium is shown to be unique, and analytic comparative statics are derived. A reduction in the cost of investment yields an increase in wages for workers, and a decrease in rents for managers. Simultaneously, large firms increase in size while smaller firms decrease their employment. Similar results arise for an improvement (in the first-order stochastic sense) of the distribution of ability.

Learning before *Learning before Trading*

Economic agents are often uncertain about their valuations for goods or services. Learning about said goods/services allows them to reduce this uncertainty. What does trade look like when a buyer and a seller with unknown and interdependent valuations are able to learn in private? We explore this question in a stylized bilateral trade model where a seller privately observes a signal before pricing the good. Before observing the price, the buyer flexibly acquires a signal at a cost that increases in informativeness. We find that when information is free, the seller extracts all the surplus whenever there is trade. As a result, equilibria are Pareto-ranked: the best equilibrium is the one where full information is acquired and a worst equilibrium is one where no learning takes place. We show that for positive but vanishing costs, prices must eventually convey information.

Selected Work in Progress

Incentivizing Effort in the Age of AI

Work in progress.

Research Assistant Experience

Arizona State University, for Prof. Hector Chade — 2023–2026

Arizona State University, for Prof. Mark Whitmeyer — 2025

Teaching Experience

Instructor

Microeconomic Principles (ECN 212) — Summer 2025, Summer 2026

Teaching Assistant

Microeconomics I and II (MS-Econ) (ECN 530, ECN532)	2025
Managerial Economics (MBA) (ECN 502)	2025
Game Theory (ECN 416)	2024
Intermediate Microeconomics (ECN 312)	2023, 2025, 2026
Microeconomic Principles (ECN 212)	2022, 2023

Professional Experience

Intern, Education Division, CAF Development Bank of Latin America and the Caribbean — 2019–2020

Seminar and Conference Presentations

2026: Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory; Jornadas de Economía del Banco Central del Uruguay; Universidad ORT Uruguay
2024 - 2026: Arizona State University General Economics Workshop

Scholarships & Awards

Department Fellowship, Arizona State University — 2022-2025

University Block Grant, Arizona State University — 2021

Additional Information

Programming: Python, Matlab, Stata, LaTeX, Java
Languages: Spanish (native), English (fluent), Italian (fluent)
Citizenship: Uruguay, Austria

References

Hector Chade (Chair)
Rondthaler Chair in Economics and Professor
Department of Economics
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Mark Whitmeyer (Co-chair)
Assistant Professor
Department of Economics
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Galina Vereshchagina
Associate Professor and Director of the Ph.D. Program
Department of Economics
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Kelvin Wong (Teaching)
Executive Director of Undergraduate Programs
Department of Economics
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